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 How do we, as a society, develop solutions to environmental problems?  In tackling this 
question, we environmental law scholars sometimes come across as bleak or pessimistic.  Our 
chosen field of study, after all, is one characterized by “physical public resources” that are 
“particularly difficult to manage or regulate collectively”1 and “pervasively interrelated.”2  We 
observe difficulties in tracing back environmental harms to single discrete causes,3 and 
remark upon tensions between economic and philosophical valuations of natural resources.4  
And in frustration, we complain about the inactivity and intractability of various institutions 
such as the U.S. Congress,5 administrative agencies,6 and Conferences of the Parties of 
various international agreements.7   
 
1. See, e.g., Todd Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 221, 267 (2010). 
2. See id. at 268. 
3. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the 
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 747 (2000). 
4. See, e.g., Ray Rasker, Wilderness for Its Own Sake or as Economic Asset?, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 15, 15 (2005). 
5. See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New 
Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2008); Richard J. Lazarus, 
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 
619 (2006). 
6. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Deficit: Applying Lessons from the Economic 
Recession, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 664-65 (2009). 
7. See, e.g., David Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global Warming 
Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 148 (1999-2000). 
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The more optimistic among us sometimes place our hopes in enhanced processes of 
discussion, calling for increased opportunities for public participation and discussion to break 
through observed institutional congestion.8  Some of these calls for enhanced discussion9 
draw inspiration from theories of deliberative democracy, a “theory of civic engagement 
placing public deliberation at the heart of democratic governance.”10  As one scholar frames it, 
“[a]ccording to environmental deliberative democrats, individuals are inclined to make more 
ethical or reasonable judgments when given the opportunity in a public sphere to reflect 
about the whole environment as a common good.”11 
Proposals to enhance the deliberativeness of environmental decision-making are quite 
varied.  Some are quite moderate, such as suggestions to add opportunities for public 
participation at earlier stages of decision-making processes.12  Others are broader, such as 
proposals to create for avenues for direct citizen participation in environmental decision-
making processes.13  Finally, others are rather substantive, such as calls to provide 
substantive citizen authority over agency decision-making.14   
I admit, many of these proposals resonate with me.  I, too, share the hope — well-founded 
or not15 — that enhancing opportunities for informed, deliberative discussions about the 
environment can aid society in developing appropriate legal and policy responses.16  
Moreover, I sympathize with the idea that deliberative conversations can provide benefits 
 
8. See, e.g., Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public 
Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321 (2010); FRANK FISCHER, 
CITIZENS, EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICS OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, at xii, 147-69 
(2000); Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm 
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 4 (1998). 
9. See, e.g., Michael Ray Harris, Environmental Deliberative Democracy and the Search For 
Administrative Legitimacy: A Legal Positivism Approach, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343 (2011); 
Lazarus, supra note 5. 
10. Carri Hulet, A Glossary of Deliberative Democracy Terms, 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 27 (2005-2006). 
11. Harris, supra note 9, at 364. 
12. Id. at 366 (citing Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1518 (1992)). 
13. Id. at 366 (citing John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory 
Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 921-26 (1998)). 
14. Id. at 366 (citing Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of Deliberative Democracy: A Proposal for a 
Popular Branch, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 359, 363-65, 408 (2002)). 
15. See Dan M. Kahan et al., The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality 
Conflict, and Climate Change 14 (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 89, 2011) available 
at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871503&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1871503 (describing empirical studies as demonstrating that “[a]s ordinary people 
learn more science and become more proficient in modes of reasoning characteristic of scientific 
inquiry, they do not reliably converge on assessments of climate change risks supported by scientific 
evidence. Instead they more form beliefs that are even more reliably characteristic of persons who 
hold their particular cultural worldviews.”); see also Michael Binder et al., Shortcuts To 
Deliberation? How Cues Reshape the Role of Information in Direct Democracy Voting, 48 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 97, 127-28 (2011) (discussing literature that questions whether deliberation processes enhance 
substantive decisionmaking); Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does 
Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9 (2006). 
16. See Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. 
REV. 659, 688-92 (2005) (critiquing the limited avenues available for the public to engage in dialogue 
with agencies in decision-making processes). 
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independent from achieving more thoughtful environmental protection — for example, “the 
moral and psychological benefits of authentic participation in democratic practices.”17 
I do not intend, in this book review, to weigh in normatively on the desirability of 
deliberative democracy.  Instead, this (all-too-lengthy) introduction is meant to draw 
attention to some of the gaps left in calls for environmental deliberative democracy: that is, 
what these citizen conversations might look like in particular contexts, and how they could be 
substantively enhanced.18  That is, how do we even have these public discussions regarding 
legal approaches towards addressing environmental problems, assuming that such 
discussions are desirable?   
This question is especially relevant in the context of international environmental 
problems, where even citizens who are familiar with the physical contexts behind the 
problems are often less familiar with the relevant legal frameworks.  Take two international 
environmental issues that were raised in this year’s celebration of World Water Day:19 (1) the 
importance of addressing the availability of clean water,20 and (2) the production of food in a 
sustainable, less wasteful manner.21 
To have a substantive discussion about how to enhance access to clean water, we need to 
be able to understand some of the factual underpinnings behind providing access to clean 
water. We might also want to be able to talk about the range of goals we may have in 
developing legal regime for creating clean water access international law doctrines that apply 
to clean water access — do we focus on some baseline quantity of access, or a balancing 
approach, or an equity approach? And even if we do decide upon our goals, we might want to 
be aware of the range of legal instruments available to further those goals.22  We might also 
need to be able to discuss whether a right to clean water — even if established — would have 
any effect on actual access, and if so, what sorts of effects that might have.23 
Other process-based considerations may also factor into our conversations.  For example, if 
we were to focus on producing food in a sustainable manner, we might want to be aware of 
the range of stakeholders on such issues, ranging from state actors to international 
institutions (such as the Food and Agricultural Organization24) to non-governmental 
organizations (such as the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty25) to 
 
17. Geoffrey W.G. Leane, Deliberative Democracy and the Internet: New Possibilities for Legitimising 
Law through Public Discourse?, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 373, 390 (2010). 
18. Cf. Leane, supra note 17, at 374 (expressing frustration that a particular environmental network 
with the potential for deliberative discourse failed to create avenues for communication that was 
“informed by [] expertise, deliberation or reflection”). 
19. See About World Water Day, U.N. WATER, http://www.unwater.org/worldwaterday/about.html 
(describing World Water Day as “[a]n international day to celebrate freshwater [that] was 
recommended at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). 
The United Nations General Assembly responded by designating 22 March 1993 as the first World 
Water Day.”). 
20. See id. 
21. See id. 
22. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 
108 YALE L.J. 677, 704-13 (1999). 
23. See, e.g., Bruce Pardy, The Dark Irony of International Water Rights, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 907, 
909-16 (2011). 
24. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/ last visited July 1, 2012). 
25. INT’L PLANNING COMM. FOR FOOD SOVEREIGNTY, 
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private entities (such as the Grocery Manufacturers Association26).  We may want to know 
the ways in which these stakeholders can shape the international legal process, as well as 
factors that shape when and how agreements can actually be reached.  How might, for 
example, food-related issues get onto any international legal agenda?  Why might states get 
involved in reaching a sustainable food-production related agreement?  And what sorts of 
steps might factor into any process of creating an actual international agreement involving 
sustainable food production? 
Moreover, conversations regarding problem solving in both of these areas may involve 
asking questions about how any agreement — if reached — might be complied with or 
enforced.  Are compliance and enforcement left to various states for implementation?  Should 
that be accomplished legislatively, or judicially, or both?  And what are the factors that 
influence how and the extent to which states engage in enforcement and compliance?  And 
what sorts of review processes might there be for determining adequate enforcement and 
compliance? 
To even begin such discussions, it may be helpful to have a common language about how 
international environmental law decisions get made.27  That is why I am so pleased to be able 
to review Daniel Bodansky’s book, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law.28  
To me, this book can provide some much-needed foundational background for the sorts of 
deliberative discussions I described earlier.  Rather than taking the more traditional 
environmental casebook approach of organizing the material into physical subject matters, 
such as air, water, and wildlife,29 Professor Bodansky organizes his text functionally, 
explaining the multitude of factors that enter into the development of international 
environmental law and using cases from the different physical subject matters as 
illustrations, rather than organizational centers.  In doing so, he details the general physical 
features of international environmental problems,30 available policy mechanisms for 
addressing such problems,31 and state implementation approaches for various international 
commitments32 — topics that are often also explored in traditional international 
environmental texts but organized in a physical subject matter casebook.33 
 
http://www.foodsovereignty.org/Aboutus/WhatisIPC.aspx last visited July 1, 2012). 
26. GROCERY MFRS. ASS’N, http://www.gmaonline.org/ last visited July 1, 2012). 
27. See Jennifer L. Hochschild, If Democracies Need Informed Voters, How Can They Thrive While 
Expanding Enfranchisement?, 9 ELECTION L.J. 111 (2010) (describing how “[p]olitical scientists 
concur that a knowledgeable citizenry is necessary for effective and gratifying democratic 
governance.”); see also Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A 
New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1303-04 
(2004) (describing how deliberative democracy theories entail a greater knowledge burden on 
voters). 
28. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2010). 
29. See Emily L. Dawson & Lincoln L. Davies, Book Review, Environmental Law And Policy: Nature, 
Law, And Society, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 469, 469 (2000) (“Traditionally, environmental law 
casebooks grapple with the dilemma posed to professors by organizing their materials into physical 
subject matters . . . .”). 
30. See BODANSKY, supra note 28, at 37-56. 
31. See id. at 57-85. 
32. See id. at 205-24. 
33. See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY (2d ed. 2006) 
(organizing the study of international environmental law in a more physical media-specific 
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Much of these topics are explored in other general international environmental texts.  But 
Professor Bodansky provides a larger political and practical perspective on the question of the 
making of international environmental law.  For example, in one chapter, he discusses the 
process of negotiating international environmental agreements.34  In this chapter, he explores 
the differences between legal and nonlegal instruments,35 state and non-state actors,36 and 
contractual v. legislative instruments.37  Such topics are often explored in other international 
environmental texts,38 but rarely provided in as functional a manner as this, where he 
eschews an in-depth focus on individual treaties and cases in order to provide more abstract 
but generalizable descriptions of how such instruments work.  
In some ways, Professor Bodansky is perhaps too modest about his work.39  In an early 
chapter, he describes three perspectives on international environmental law: a doctrinal 
approach, which focuses on day-to-day analysis of international environmental doctrines to 
determine what the law “is”;40 a policy approach, which focuses on more normative 
arguments about what international environmental law “should be;”41 and an explanatory 
approach, which focuses on “two topics: first, the emergence (or non-emergence) of 
international environmental norms, and second, their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness).”42  In 
turn, he describes all of these perspectives as being “essential parts of the international 
environmental lawyer’s toolkit,”43 suggesting that his coverage of all three approaches is 
simply an attempt to fill the toolboxes of international environmental lawyers. 
But Professor Bodansky’s meta-approach is more than the sum of the three perspectives 
he describes.  While his approach may be modest in the sense that he argues for what he calls 
a “thirty-percent solution,”44 whereby international environmental law plays a constructive, 
but not exclusive role in addressing international environmental problems, he also argues for 
a procedural approach of “encourag[ing] and enabl[ing] . . . international cooperation.”45  Such 
an approach fits squarely into what I would call a “deliberative knowledge-oriented” approach 
to international environmental law.  By avoiding his own normative assessments of the 
various inputs into international environmental negotiations, but instead on focusing on a 
general discussion of potential normative pros and cons of various approaches, he supplies 
readers with the tools to achieve the “sufficient reasoning ability and philosophical knowledge 
 
approach). 
34. See BODANSKY, supra note 28, at 154-90. 
35. See id. at 155-57. 
36. See id. at 157. 
37. See id. at 157-58. 
38. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN, & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2011). 
39. See, e.g., BODANSKY, supra note 28, at 16 (describing his book as having a “comparatively modest 
agenda”). 
40. See id. at 5. 
41. See id. at 6-8. 
42. Id. at 8. 
43. Id. at 9. 
44. Id. at 15. 
45. Id. at 16. 
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to be able to debate” international environmental issues in the way that “[deliberative 
democracy] demands.”46  
Professor Bodansky’s commitment — intentional or not — to what I call a “deliberative-
knowledge-oriented” approach is most evident in his two chapters on the reasons why states 
might implement their international environmental obligations,47 and how to evaluate the 
effectiveness of international environmental agreements.  For example, in his discussion of 
how parties to international environmental agreements might actually implement their 
obligations, Professor Bodansky explains how the particularities of certain international 
environmental agreements can constrain the availability of tailored mechanisms for 
addressing particular problems.  He illustrates his explanation with contrasting examples of 
the Fisheries and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Fisheries Compliance Agreement and the 
London Convention of the Dumping of Wastes at Sea adopted the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.48  When an 
agreement provides considerable detail, such as the Fisheries Compliance Agreement, a 
participating state may be fairly confined in terms of how it addresses particular problems; in 
contrast, when an agreement provides more standards-based approaches (such as the London 
Convention’s approach of requiring states to take “appropriate” measures), a participating 
state has more flexibility in terms of taking into account its own legal and national 
circumstances.49  But taken in conjunction with his discussion of the different ways to 
evaluate the effectiveness of international environmental agreements,50 we can see that an 
agreement that provides considerable detail on state implementation may lead to greater 
compliance — at least under certain metrics — than a more flexible approach by “reducing 
ambiguity about what an agreement requires” and “make violations more apparent and less 
costly.”51 
In providing this sort of interlaced discussion, Professor Bodansky provides the sort of 
background understandings useful for tackling other international environmental problems.  
Take the problem of access to clean water.  Although there are a number of international 
legal instruments that implicitly or explicitly support a right to clean water,52 with the most 
recent being the UN General Assembly’s passage of a resolution formally recognizing a 
human right to water and sanitation,53 the actual content of that right is “difficult to concisely 
define.”54  But is a concise definition desirable?  And to the extent that definitions are 
 
46. See Somin, supra note 27, at 1304; see also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT 57-58 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996). 
47. See BODANSKY, supra note 28, at 205-51. 
48. See id. at 211-12. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. at 252-66. 
51. See id. at 264. 
52. See George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the Right to Water and Its Minimum Core: Legal 
Construction and the Role of National Jurisprudence, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. Rev. 127, 137-154 
(2011) (outlining “the right to water” “through the traditional activity of legal construction; the 
intellectual origin of the right to water in international relations, its legal basis, scope and 
obligations are all comprehensively treated.”).  
53. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/L.63, U.N. Doc. A/64/L.63/Rev.1 (July 28, 
2010). 
54. See McGraw, supra note 52, at 137. 
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desirable, should they include quantifying access, or extending access to include that 
necessary for subsistence livelihoods or even ecosystems?55  In order to deliberate on these 
questions, we would need to understand some of the factors described in The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Law: that is, the tensions between more detailed formal 
agreements and tailored implementation and even state consensus on whether to reach an 
agreement. 
Another example of Professor Bodansky’s deliberative-knowledge-oriented approach is his 
discussion of how one might evaluate the effectiveness of international environmental laws, 
discussing more traditional metrics such as state noncompliance,56 but also alternative 
approaches towards evaluating legal effectiveness, such as behavioral effectiveness or 
problem-solving effectiveness.57  He also brings nuance into his discussions of legal 
noncompliance; while he acknowledges that some critics of noncomplying states assert “bad-
faith ratification,”58 he presents other possible interpretations, ranging from states “changing 
[their] mind[s]” to states viewing a prior agreement as developing in illegitimate ways such 
that their initial normative commitments are weakened.59  Moreover, he alludes to the 
complexity involved with interpreting a state’s “mind,” as it were,60 by discussing how 
different leaders might come to power in particular states and thereby draw in different 
values.61  He also provides a more nuanced approach towards analyzing the “intent” behind 
noncompliance, describing how 
To the extent that a violation results, it may represent an act of omission rather than a 
commission; that is, it may result from insufficient will to comply rather than from an 
informative intent to renege....The factors that proved sufficient for ratification are too 
weak to overcome the domestic resistance to implementation.62 
Again, such background perspectives are useful in tackling international environmental in 
issues developing areas.  Take the problem of sustainable agriculture.  In the world of 
sustainable agriculture, many discussions revolve around the implementation of the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGR Treaty) 
adopted in 2001,63 described as “the first ever binding multilateral agreement on sustainable 
agriculture.”64 According to its terms, the PGR Treaty seeks to promote “the conservation and 
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable 
 
55. See Implementing the Human Right to Water in the West: Conference Report, 48 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 1, 8-10 (2011). 
56. See BODANSKY, supra note 28, at 228-31. 
57. See id. at 255-58. 
58. Id. at 228. 
59. Id. at 229. 
60. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (describing the conundrums involved with assessing a state’s 
“intent,” given the involvement of multiple actors). 
61. BODANSKY, supra note 28, at 229. 
62. Id. at 229-30. 
63. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2009, 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf [hereinafter PGR Treaty]. 
64. See Gregory Rose, International Law of Sustainable Agriculture in the 21st Century: The 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 583, 583 (2003). 
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sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food security.”65  But what does state 
noncompliance with the PGR treaty mean?  The PGR Treaty, for example, has had four 
meetings of its Governing Body without reaching agreement on particular compliance 
mechanisms,66 even though the terms of the PGR Treaty contemplates the establishment of 
such mechanisms.67  What does this lack of agreement suggest about the prevalence of 
noncompliance with the PGR Treaty?   As Professor Bodansky observes, “[t]o the extent that 
the obligations established by a rule are unclear, it may be difficult or even impossible to 
identify the required (or prohibited) conduct, and, consequently, to characterize behavior as 
“compliant” or “non-compliant.”68  In addition, to evaluate the effectiveness of the PGR 
Treaty, it may be helpful to examine other metrics for effectiveness, such as the extent to 
which PGR has promoted changes in state behavior regarding sustainable agriculture (and 
whether such changes would have happened even were the PGR Treaty not to exist).  Such 
evaluations, in turn, could inform larger conversations about “where to go from here” by 
providing ways to evaluate existing experiences with international legal agreements 
addressing sustainable agriculture. 
As many reviewers have already observed, The Art and Craft of International 
Environmental Law provides an expansive lens for scholars and practitioners to approach 
international environmental law, covering not only questions of what international 
environmental law is, but also how it develops, how it gets implemented, and how its 
effectiveness can be evaluated.69  I would argue, though, that it is also an important 
contribution for strengthening informed democratic discussions about how we as citizens 
might like to see international environmental law develop, and why.  
 
 
 
 
 
65. PGR Treaty, supra note 63, at art. 1.1. 
66. See Nils Goeteyn & Frank Maes, Compliance Mechanisms in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: An Effective Way to Improve Compliance?, 10 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 791, 803 (2011). 
67. PGR Treaty, supra note 63, at art. 21. 
68. See BODANSKY, supra note 28, at 254. 
69. See BODANSKY, supra note 28, jacket notes.  
